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Suppose that you are an agnostic and that, in principle, there is no evidence to support neither the theist position nor the atheist position. Should you believe in God? The French mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) sees us in this very position; we have no evidence or reason either way. For Pascal, we literally have to hold either the belief that God exists or lack the belief that God exists; we must decide. Pascal believes that we should definitely believe.

So on what basis does Pascal decide to believe in God? In the famous ‘Wager’ passage of his Pensées, Pascal likens the situation to a bet. Say if I choose to believe in God and lead a religious life, I stand to gain an eternity of happiness in heaven if I’m right. If I’m wrong, it makes no difference (aside the loss of some worldly pleasures in the name of my religion). However, say if I choose not to believe in God, I don’t gain anything if I’m right (aside said worldly pleasures) but, if I’m wrong, I face an eternity in hell. Therefore, without doubt, the rational bet is to believe in God. 

A reader who is familiar with the classical arguments put forward in Philosophy of Religion are most likely already aware of Pascal’s Wager on some level. The argument, according to atheists and theists alike, is extremely weak and common sense is enough to defeat it. It doesn’t require any specialist input and, in my experience, the Wager is mostly brought up for fun rather than as a serious argument. 
Perhaps it’s entirely pointless for me to bring up just to criticise. Perhaps I’m guilty of raising a particularly weak argument just to knock it down with ease. There are indeed more relevant arguments out there and indeed the Wager is speculated to be a joke (I’ll treat it as genuine here). I’ve brought it up because I still see this argument used to some degree. The criticisms presented here will, I hope, show that this argument is essentially dead and buried and that it should only be referenced (if at all) for fun or in context of the history of ideas.

Can we decide to believe?

A popular common sense response to this argument is pointing out that believing is not something we can decide to do. Richard Dawkins writes rather little on Pascal’s Wager in The God Delusion, but does begin by putting forth this very criticism with great clarity: -

“Believing is not something you can decide to do as a matter of policy. At least, it is not something I can decide to do as an act of will. I can decide to go to church and I can decide to recite the Nicene Creed, and I can decide to swear on a stack of bibles that I believe every word inside them. But none of that can make me actually believe it if I don’t.”

Dawkins believes that Pascal’s Wager can only ever be an argument for feigning belief in God. However, it’s important to note that Pascal acknowledges in his Pensées that we cannot simply decide what to believe as an act of will. He does, however, give advice on how to ‘cure ourselves of the affliction of unbelief’. Pascal states that we should learn to believe from those who once in the same situation: -

Blaise Pascal (1623 - 1662)  

“They behaved just as if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile”

So the advice is to talk to people who once doubted but now believe, and also to act as though we do believe and we’ll naturally end up believing. Going back to my Dawkins quote, it seems fair to assume that he doesn’t find this convincing, having in a sense already stated that acting religiously wouldn’t cause him to believe in God.
I brought this up to call into question whether Pascal’s advice is reasonable or not. I find myself in slight agreement with Pascal – I think it is potentially possible for one to attain a belief in God by acting religiously. It does sound questionable – indeed, I find it difficult to imagine myself attaining belief in a deity simply because I’ve acted as though I possess that belief but when you think about the range of psychological phenomena that has been recorded perhaps it isn’t too far-fetched after all. Without going into this too much, at best I believe this is up for debate.
Ultimately, whether or not a person can trick themselves into belief doesn’t give any truth value to that belief but I thought it worth pointing out that interestingly this common sense criticism might not be valid at all.

Which God?

Another common argument put forward points out that the Wager is based on the assumption that the odds for and against God’s existence are balanced so that we cannot decide between them – so 50:50. There are a lot of atheists I could quote who would disagree with this (it’s tempting to go back to Dawkins here) but it’s not necessary.
Let’s assume that it’s 50:50 that God exists or not. Interestingly, by ‘God’ exists, Pascal is actually referring to a very particular God – namely that of Christianity (to my knowledge, he was Roman Catholic). Could it not be the case that the Allah of Islam religion is the existing God? What about Ba’al? When you think about it, why are we only considering monotheism? Could it not be the case that many gods exist? Perhaps Zeus and Apollo should get some probability in our Wager. Not to mention the many gods of Hinduism. So surely, it should be 50:50 whether a ‘divine being or beings’ exist or not. Then the 50% probability that a divine being or beings exist should then be further divided into all the gods listed, right? 25% chance for polytheism, 25% chance for monotheism. Suddenly it’s not so clear where to place one’s bet. Especially since the belief in the wrong God might land you in hell for all eternity. What does become clear from this criticism however is (and this is without going into massive detail) that Pascal’s Wager is embarrassingly weak and barely worthy of any consideration at all. This criticism surely defeats Pascal’s Wager entirely.

Furthermore, it’s not particularly obvious that, should any given God exist, he would approve of a man who ‘wagered’ a belief in God because it maximised his chances of ‘winning’ eternal bliss and avoiding eternal damnation. What would God think of this self-interested motive?
Indeed, it’s questionable what kind of God would punish ‘unbelief’ in a person with eternal damnation. Especially if it is the case that Pascal described – that there’s no reason for believing either way. There are so many different issues with the assumptions on which the Wager is based that if one were to support Pascal’s theory, they would have their work set out for them.  

Final word

For those people who genuinely believe that the Wager holds water as a theory, I have something extra for your consideration. It’s obvious from the start that the Wager can be accused of being very self-interested; it’s in our best interests to believe in God, says the argument. Perhaps it’s worth considering more than just oneself in these situations. Is your belief and world view beneficial for others? Is organised religion a force for good in the world? Naturally, the great many theists would argue that their religion is necessarily a force for good since God is good and his will must be also. However, it doesn’t hurt to be more mindful and aware and most thinking persons are forced to confront similar questions about their views at some point.

Aside that, my predictable conclusion is that Pascal’s Wager is absolutely ridiculous. If genuine, this argument is a selfish, intellectually dishonest, waste of ink and paper by a great mathematician and scientist who should have known better. Coming back to what I said earlier, this should be an argument referenced as fun or in the context of the history of ideas. Any attempt to argue Pascal’s case should be regarded as insulting since it seems to take little more than basic consideration to show the flaws in the reasoning.
As previously mentioned, there is speculation about whether Pascal was serious or not when writing the Wager. If anyone has any information regarding the sincerity of his writing, I’d be very much interested to hear it. Don’t get me wrong, I’m genuinely interested in the history of ideas and the question of Pascal’s sincere beliefs has become a matter of interest to me upon writing this. One source tells me that Pascal had a carriage accident which led to a profound religious experience (not unusual. A. J. Ayer had a near-death experience which temporarily shook his conviction that we do not survive our bodily deaths) but it seems odd that a man with such mathematical and scientific genius would believe his Wager to be sound. Any sources of information or comments are welcomed as always. 

Full Length Talk by Daniel Dennett - 'How To Tell You're An Atheist'

Interesting talk by Daniel Dennett. His mention and promotion of the Clergy Project is something that I think should be especially mentioned here.
Dennett's attitude towards believers is quite refreshing, in my opinion, and has made me reflect upon the way that I see religious beliefs and the people who hold those beliefs. I feel that we should show that, as supporters of a free and rational society, we have no room for the fanatical and dangerous ideas that come with religion. We should show this while aspiring to remain as peaceful and thoughtful as this great contemporary philosopher.

Also, I would like to announce here that I plan to write three separate essays on atheism and religion which I'll name: -
- Why are Atheists so Hateful?
- Why are Atheists so Angry?
- Why are Atheists so Arrogant?
I'm writing these in response to the fact that these are the three suggestions that popped up when I typed the words 'Why are atheists' into my Google Chrome search bar. I actually find it quite shocking but I'll same no more here. Feel free to post comments of other suggestions on search engines about atheism that made you think.

I was, in fact, going to type 'Why are atheists predominately male?' in response to the statistics I read here (http://www.atheistcensus.com/country) about the UK. Of a survey consisting of over 19,000 atheists, over 75% are male. I think this is an interesting statistic and definitely one worthy of investigation. Perhaps I'll write something about this in the future.

An Essay on Dualism and An Analysis of Descartes' use of Leibniz's Law

(I wrote this essay during my A-levels as a revision aid. At the time, my philosophy teacher requested to use it as a revision aid for other members of the class. There were numerous errors in the essay and some explanations weren't necessarily as clear as they could have been. Therefore I've updated the essay and added in any necessary information without re-writing it completely. In other words, I've updated it while trying to stay true to the original where possible. Hence, this may still come across as lacking some serious discussion about the scientific or metaphysical validity of Leibniz's law or the distinction between 'The  Indiscernibility of Identicals' and 'The Identity of Indiscernibles'. Also, proper analysis of Descartes' method and ideas is lacking. The explanation of his ideas that I give leaves out other important aspects of his reason and work - although they are perhaps not strictly relevant here. There is a lack of deeper discussion but for its purposes, this essay is adequate.
Also, the essay does focus most of its criticism on Descartes' Substance Dualism rather than other dualist theories such as that of Plato. This doesn't reflect any dislike for Descartes as a Philosopher. In my opinion, Descartes' Meditations has great historical importance in Philosophy and I regard it as a work of literature which could easily rival other Philosophical eloquence such as Plato's Symposium or Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra.)

Dualism 

In Philosophy of Mind there are two main types of dualism. These are Property Dualism and Substance Dualism. Property dualism is the theory of mind that while the only 'type' of substance in existence is physical in nature, these physical things can have 'mental' or non-physical properties. I'm not interested in discussing Property Dualism here.
Substance Dualism, on the other hand, is the theory that there are two ontologically distinct substances in existence. There is physical/material substance of the world that we perceive and there's the immaterial/non-physical substance. The latter substance includes minds or souls, beliefs, desires, etc.

When one describes the non-physical 'substance', it's hard to find the correct terms. 'Substance' is a word for physical matter - like such you can place in a test tube, for example. It should be understood that for want of better words, the term 'substance' (or logical substance, to make a Philosophical distinction) has to suffice.

Substance Dualism was famously held by French Philosopher Rene Descartes. Substance Dualism is sometimes referred to as 'Cartesian Dualism' in Descartes honor because he attempted to provide rational arguments for distinguishing the mind and body as separate entities. Descartes Dualism is Interactionist-Substance Dualism. 'Internationist' means that the physical and mental can interact, which isn't a necessary condition of Substance Dualism.
Descartes wasn't the first Substance Dualist Philosopher. The theory is seen in Ancient Greek Philosopher Plato's work 'Phaedo' in which Socrates expresses the Dualist position when discussing death. There's evidence to suggest that Substance Dualism extends back a lot further than Plato and Socrates also. A main impetus for dualism is that it opens up the possibility of a life after bodily death.


The Mental and Physical 

The Substance Dualist states that the mental (non-physical) is a substance that is capable of existing independently of the physical. This non-physical substance is empirically undetectable since being detectable requires the physical property of being extended in space.

Below are two lists of qualities. The first list is of qualities that Physical Substance has. The second is a list of qualities that Mental Substance has (according to the Dualist)

Physical
- Empirically detectable
- Are extended in space
- Are subject to physical laws (causality)
- Objective
- Divisible
- Can be doubted 

Mental 
- Empirically undetectable
- Are not extended in space
- Not subject to physical laws
- Subjective/private
- Not divisible.
- Cannot be doubted

The last point on both lists (in bold) lead us on to Descartes' contribution to the Substance Dualist theory.


Descartes and His Arguments for Substance Dualism

To fully understand and appreciate Descartes' arguments, some background knowledge of his work is necessary. Descartes thought that it was possible that all our beliefs are built on uncertain foundations and therefore are unstable. Descartes saw our beliefs like a building. If the foundations of the building are weak, the building may not stand up. Similarly, if we base our beliefs upon weak foundations, we could have a nasty shock when the foundation gives way and our beliefs all show to be false.
This lead Descartes to hunt for beliefs which you could not reasonably doubt. However, this proved to be an extremely difficult task. Descartes would throw out or suspend judgement on things of which he could conceive the slightest element of doubt. In fact, Descartes supposed that in any given instant, he could be dreaming, insane, or even that an all-powerful, evil demon was deceiving him. The logical possibility of there being such deception prevented Descartes from accepting even the most evident of truths.
It does seem that if he allows for these possibilities, Descartes has effectively denied himself any grasp of any kind of knowledge. However, Descartes finally realised that he did indeed have one piece of knowledge which was beyond all doubt - his own existence. To be dreaming, insane or at the mercy of an evil demon, he must first exist. He is thinking, therefore he exists, or 'I think, therefore I am'.
Descartes noticed that this only proves his existence as a 'thinking thing' and therefore doesn't prove the existence of his physical body. This is important for Descartes first argument.

The argument from doubt is fairly simple. As stated, Descartes could doubt the existence of his physical body but he could not doubt that he exists as a thinking substance. Therefore, they must be different entities entirely. This is based on Leibniz's Law. This

The second argument is the argument from indivisibility. Descartes draws a distinction between the body and mind by claiming that the body is divisible but the mind is not. The body is physical and extended in space, therefore it's divisible. The mind is not extended in space. Descartes gave the example that one could lose a leg and the mind would be unaffected. The body has been divided but the mind remains the same.


Criticisms of Descartes' Arguments and His Use of Leibniz's law

Leibniz's law states that if X has all the properties of Y and also that neither X or Y has a property that the other does not possess, then they are the same thing. This may seem like a truism and this the basis of Descartes' arguments for dualism.

Here is an apparent problem with the law: -

1. Clark Kent is Superman's secret identity; that is, they're the same person (identical).
2. Lois Lane thinks that Clark Kent cannot fly.
3. Lois Lane thinks that Superman Can fly.
4. Therefore Superman has a property that Clark Kent does not possess, namely that Lois thinks one can fly and the other cannot.
5. Therefore Superman is not identical to Clark Kent.

This line of argument is called a reduction ad absurdum. It is supposed to show, in this case, that there are exceptions to Leibniz's law and therefore it isn't valid. There's a more common 'exception' to the law called 'the masked man fallacy': I know who my father is. I don't know who the masked man is. Therefore the masked man cannot be my father.

So does this mean that Leibniz's Law is invalid? Not necessarily. This particular criticism is incorrect. Both the Superman argument and the masked man fallacy make the same mistake. Premise 4 of the Superman argument states that it's a property of Superman that Lois Lane thinks he can fly. Is that really what we mean by a 'property' of Superman? Surely it's better understood that it is a property of Lois Lane that she believes Superman can fly and that Kent cannot.

The argument from doubt commits this very error. Is it a property X that I can doubt it's existence? As seen above, no it's not. So Descartes' doubt of his body isn't a property of his body.

So the argument doesn't necessarily call into question the validity of Leibniz's law. It just shows that we should be very careful with what we regard as properties.


The argument from indivisibility seems flawed. True enough, if one lost a leg, the mind would remain as it was before. However, this is hardly surprising. Most materialists wouldn't claim that the mind resides in the legs. They focus more on the brain. Some types of brain surgery can be conducted without any implications on what we regard as 'the mind'. However, some forms of brain damage cause a person to lose mental abilities that Descartes claim are 'non-physical'. People lose the ability to move or speak. Some lose memories. There are incidents of massive brain trauma which have resulted in very obvious changes in personality and behaviour. This certainly seems like a division of the mind which has resulted from physical division or loss.