Suppose that you are
an agnostic and that, in principle, there is no evidence to support neither the
theist position nor the atheist position. Should you believe in God? The French
mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) sees us in this very position; we have
no evidence or reason either way. For Pascal, we literally have to hold either
the belief that God exists or lack the belief that God exists; we must decide. Pascal believes that we
should definitely believe.
A reader who is familiar with the classical arguments put
forward in Philosophy of Religion are most likely already aware of Pascal’s
Wager on some level. The argument, according to atheists and theists alike, is
extremely weak and common sense is enough to defeat it. It doesn’t require any
specialist input and, in my experience, the Wager is mostly brought up for fun
rather than as a serious argument.
Perhaps it’s entirely pointless for me to bring up just to criticise. Perhaps I’m guilty of raising a particularly weak argument just to knock it down with ease. There are indeed more relevant arguments out there and indeed the Wager is speculated to be a joke (I’ll treat it as genuine here). I’ve brought it up because I still see this argument used to some degree. The criticisms presented here will, I hope, show that this argument is essentially dead and buried and that it should only be referenced (if at all) for fun or in context of the history of ideas.
Perhaps it’s entirely pointless for me to bring up just to criticise. Perhaps I’m guilty of raising a particularly weak argument just to knock it down with ease. There are indeed more relevant arguments out there and indeed the Wager is speculated to be a joke (I’ll treat it as genuine here). I’ve brought it up because I still see this argument used to some degree. The criticisms presented here will, I hope, show that this argument is essentially dead and buried and that it should only be referenced (if at all) for fun or in context of the history of ideas.
Can we decide to
believe?
A popular common sense response to this argument is pointing
out that believing is not something we can decide to do. Richard Dawkins writes
rather little on Pascal’s Wager in The God Delusion, but does begin by putting
forth this very criticism with great clarity: -
“Believing is not something you can decide to do as a matter of policy. At least, it is not something I can decide to do as an act of will. I can decide to go to church and I can decide to recite the Nicene Creed, and I can decide to swear on a stack of bibles that I believe every word inside them. But none of that can make me actually believe it if I don’t.”
Dawkins believes that Pascal’s Wager can only ever be an argument for feigning belief in God. However, it’s important to note that Pascal acknowledges in his Pensées that we cannot simply decide what to believe as an act of will. He does, however, give advice on how to ‘cure ourselves of the affliction of unbelief’. Pascal states that we should learn to believe from those who once in the same situation: -
“Believing is not something you can decide to do as a matter of policy. At least, it is not something I can decide to do as an act of will. I can decide to go to church and I can decide to recite the Nicene Creed, and I can decide to swear on a stack of bibles that I believe every word inside them. But none of that can make me actually believe it if I don’t.”
Dawkins believes that Pascal’s Wager can only ever be an argument for feigning belief in God. However, it’s important to note that Pascal acknowledges in his Pensées that we cannot simply decide what to believe as an act of will. He does, however, give advice on how to ‘cure ourselves of the affliction of unbelief’. Pascal states that we should learn to believe from those who once in the same situation: -
 |
| Blaise Pascal (1623 - 1662) |
“They behaved just as
if they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That
will make you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile”
So the advice is to talk to people who once doubted but now
believe, and also to act as though we do believe and we’ll naturally end up
believing. Going back to my Dawkins quote, it seems fair to assume that he
doesn’t find this convincing, having in a sense already stated that acting
religiously wouldn’t cause him to believe in God.
I brought this up to call into question whether Pascal’s advice is reasonable or not. I find myself in slight agreement with Pascal – I think it is potentially possible for one to attain a belief in God by acting religiously. It does sound questionable – indeed, I find it difficult to imagine myself attaining belief in a deity simply because I’ve acted as though I possess that belief but when you think about the range of psychological phenomena that has been recorded perhaps it isn’t too far-fetched after all. Without going into this too much, at best I believe this is up for debate.
Ultimately, whether or not a person can trick themselves into belief doesn’t give any truth value to that belief but I thought it worth pointing out that interestingly this common sense criticism might not be valid at all.
I brought this up to call into question whether Pascal’s advice is reasonable or not. I find myself in slight agreement with Pascal – I think it is potentially possible for one to attain a belief in God by acting religiously. It does sound questionable – indeed, I find it difficult to imagine myself attaining belief in a deity simply because I’ve acted as though I possess that belief but when you think about the range of psychological phenomena that has been recorded perhaps it isn’t too far-fetched after all. Without going into this too much, at best I believe this is up for debate.
Ultimately, whether or not a person can trick themselves into belief doesn’t give any truth value to that belief but I thought it worth pointing out that interestingly this common sense criticism might not be valid at all.
Which God?
Another common argument put forward points out that the
Wager is based on the assumption that the odds for and against God’s existence
are balanced so that we cannot decide between them – so 50:50. There are a lot
of atheists I could quote who would disagree with this (it’s tempting to go
back to Dawkins here) but it’s not necessary.
Let’s assume that it’s 50:50 that God exists or not. Interestingly, by ‘God’ exists, Pascal is actually referring to a very particular God – namely that of Christianity (to my knowledge, he was Roman Catholic). Could it not be the case that the Allah of Islam religion is the existing God? What about Ba’al? When you think about it, why are we only considering monotheism? Could it not be the case that many gods exist? Perhaps Zeus and Apollo should get some probability in our Wager. Not to mention the many gods of Hinduism. So surely, it should be 50:50 whether a ‘divine being or beings’ exist or not. Then the 50% probability that a divine being or beings exist should then be further divided into all the gods listed, right? 25% chance for polytheism, 25% chance for monotheism. Suddenly it’s not so clear where to place one’s bet. Especially since the belief in the wrong God might land you in hell for all eternity. What does become clear from this criticism however is (and this is without going into massive detail) that Pascal’s Wager is embarrassingly weak and barely worthy of any consideration at all. This criticism surely defeats Pascal’s Wager entirely.
Let’s assume that it’s 50:50 that God exists or not. Interestingly, by ‘God’ exists, Pascal is actually referring to a very particular God – namely that of Christianity (to my knowledge, he was Roman Catholic). Could it not be the case that the Allah of Islam religion is the existing God? What about Ba’al? When you think about it, why are we only considering monotheism? Could it not be the case that many gods exist? Perhaps Zeus and Apollo should get some probability in our Wager. Not to mention the many gods of Hinduism. So surely, it should be 50:50 whether a ‘divine being or beings’ exist or not. Then the 50% probability that a divine being or beings exist should then be further divided into all the gods listed, right? 25% chance for polytheism, 25% chance for monotheism. Suddenly it’s not so clear where to place one’s bet. Especially since the belief in the wrong God might land you in hell for all eternity. What does become clear from this criticism however is (and this is without going into massive detail) that Pascal’s Wager is embarrassingly weak and barely worthy of any consideration at all. This criticism surely defeats Pascal’s Wager entirely.
Furthermore, it’s not particularly obvious that, should any
given God exist, he would approve of a man who ‘wagered’ a belief in God because
it maximised his chances of ‘winning’ eternal bliss and avoiding eternal
damnation. What would God think of this self-interested motive?
Indeed, it’s questionable what kind of God would punish ‘unbelief’ in a person with eternal damnation. Especially if it is the case that Pascal described – that there’s no reason for believing either way. There are so many different issues with the assumptions on which the Wager is based that if one were to support Pascal’s theory, they would have their work set out for them.
Indeed, it’s questionable what kind of God would punish ‘unbelief’ in a person with eternal damnation. Especially if it is the case that Pascal described – that there’s no reason for believing either way. There are so many different issues with the assumptions on which the Wager is based that if one were to support Pascal’s theory, they would have their work set out for them.
Final word
For those people who genuinely believe that the Wager holds
water as a theory, I have something extra for your consideration. It’s obvious
from the start that the Wager can be accused of being very self-interested; it’s
in our best interests to believe in God, says the argument. Perhaps it’s worth
considering more than just oneself in these situations. Is your belief and
world view beneficial for others? Is organised religion a force for good in the
world? Naturally, the great many theists would argue that their religion is
necessarily a force for good since God is good and his will must be also. However,
it doesn’t hurt to be more mindful and aware and most thinking persons are
forced to confront similar questions about their views at some point.
Aside that, my predictable conclusion is that Pascal’s Wager
is absolutely ridiculous. If genuine, this argument is a selfish,
intellectually dishonest, waste of ink and paper by a great mathematician and scientist
who should have known better. Coming back to what I said earlier, this should
be an argument referenced as fun or in the context of the history of ideas. Any
attempt to argue Pascal’s case should be regarded as insulting since it seems
to take little more than basic consideration to show the flaws in the reasoning.
As previously mentioned, there is speculation about whether Pascal was serious or not when writing the Wager. If anyone has any information regarding the sincerity of his writing, I’d be very much interested to hear it. Don’t get me wrong, I’m genuinely interested in the history of ideas and the question of Pascal’s sincere beliefs has become a matter of interest to me upon writing this. One source tells me that Pascal had a carriage accident which led to a profound religious experience (not unusual. A. J. Ayer had a near-death experience which temporarily shook his conviction that we do not survive our bodily deaths) but it seems odd that a man with such mathematical and scientific genius would believe his Wager to be sound. Any sources of information or comments are welcomed as always.
As previously mentioned, there is speculation about whether Pascal was serious or not when writing the Wager. If anyone has any information regarding the sincerity of his writing, I’d be very much interested to hear it. Don’t get me wrong, I’m genuinely interested in the history of ideas and the question of Pascal’s sincere beliefs has become a matter of interest to me upon writing this. One source tells me that Pascal had a carriage accident which led to a profound religious experience (not unusual. A. J. Ayer had a near-death experience which temporarily shook his conviction that we do not survive our bodily deaths) but it seems odd that a man with such mathematical and scientific genius would believe his Wager to be sound. Any sources of information or comments are welcomed as always.
